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ON THE TIMING AND EFFICIENCY
OF CREATIVE DES11tUCTION
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the timing, pace and efficiency of the on-going job reallocation that
results from product and process innovation. There are strong reasons why an efficient economy
ought to concentrate both job creation and destruction during cyclical downturns, when the
opportunity cost of reallocation is lowest. Malfunctioning Labor markets can disrupt this
synchronized pattern and decouple creation and destruction. Moreover, irrespective of whether
workers are too strong or too weak, labor market inefficiencies generally lead to technological
"sclerosis," characterized by excessively slow renovation. Government incentives to pmduction
may alleviate high unemployment in this economy, but at the cost of exacerbatingsclerosis.
Creation incentives, on the contrary, increase the pace of reallocation. We show how an optimal
combination of both types of policies can restore economic efficiency.
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and NBER1 Introduction
When technology, in its broadest sense, is embodied in capital, skills, and the organization
of work, technical progress puts the economy in a state of incessant restructuring. Jts
productive structure must constantly adapt to innovations in products, techniques, modes
of organization, and to the evolving competitiveness of world markets. Production units
that embody new techniques must continually be Ciustbe
destroyed.
This process of growth through Schumpeterian "creative destruction" results in an
ongoing reallocation of factors of production from contracting production sitestoexpand-
ing ones.1 This idea finds strong support in recent studies of productivity growth using
plant-level LRD data. Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Barteisman and Dhrymes
(1991) decompose improvements in aggregate productivity into a component due to
source reallocation from relatively inefficient to relatively efficient plants, and another
due to improvements in technology purely at the plant level.2 Both studies find that
'SeeSchumpeter (1942). Cox and Aim (1993) provide numerous illustrations of creative destruction at
work in the US economy.
3A related question, that focuses on physical as opposed to human or organizationalcapital, ishow
muchof outputgrowth ii associated with capital-embodied technological progress. Using post-war US
data, Hultea (1992) estimates that 20% of residual manufacturing output growth is capital-embodied,
while Greenwood, Herkowits and Krusell (1992) reach a figure of 60% for the growth of aggregate output
per hour. The difference between the results is mainly due to whether gross-output or value-added data
are used to measure the share of equipment in income, and whether output should be adjusted for quality
change.
The much earlier study by Salter (1960) of the distribution of productivity across plants should also be
mentioned. It provides rich microeconomic evidencefromthe U.K. and U.S. supporting the heterogeneous
microeconomic structure and renovation process implied by the embodied nature of technical progress.
Some examples of this evidence glve a flavor of the study. in his table 1, for example, Salter describes the
'best and average practice" labor productivity in the U.S. blast-furnace industry: In 1911 the best-practice
plants produced 0.313 tons of pig-iron per man-hour, against an average across plants of 0.140. By 1926,
these numbers had increased to 0.573 and 0.296, respectively.
Many other examples of substantial heterogeneity in productivity within an industry can be found in
table 8. In the U.S. beet sugar industry, e.g., man-hours per unit of output (in tons) ranged form 2.81 l.a
0.88 in 1935. Moreover, plant age is strongly related to productivity in this industry. Table 9 shows that.
average man-hour per ton was 2.08 for plants constructed during 1890-99, 1.74 for 1900-09 plants,1.42 for
1910-19 plants, and 1.26 for 1920-29 plants.
More direct evidence on the embodiment issue is found in table 11. It reports for several U.S. industries
the increase in productivity between 1939 and 1948 for plants that implemented large changes in equipment.
2a major part of technical progress is associated with factor reallocation. Compounded
over the period 1972-1987 for a sample of 22 industries, the results in Baily et al. (1992)
indicate that aggregate growth is made up of 6.7 percentage points due to reallocation
and 3.5 points due to plant-level technical progress.3
(Thus,ongoing creative destruction often entails distressing job losses, and can there-
fore result in a political response to protect those jobs. If job reallocation is an inescapable
requisite of the progress in standards of living, policies that are overly protective of ex-
isting jobs may hinder the pace of renovation and lead to technological LLsclerosis. But
laissez-faire may be equally deficient. The massive job destruction that takes place in
a recession, for example, may be the sign of chronically malfunctioning markets, rather
than an aspect of the healthy recycling of jobs.
This paper aims at improving our understanding of the characteristics of an efficiently
functioning creative destruction process, of the way market inefficiencies can disrupt
this process, and of appropriate policy responses to such disruptions. We show how
malfunctioning labor and goods markets can disrupt the timing and volatility of creative
destruction over the cycle, and hamper the pace of renovation in the economy. We analyze
the effect of government incentives to production and creation decisions, and show how
an optimal combination of both types of policies can restore full efficiency.
Section 2 presents our basic model. Our economy experiences ongoing exogenous
technical progress. Its productive structure embodies the best techniques available at the
time of creation, and must continually be restructured to incorporate new innovations.
Both the labor and goods markets function inefficiently. The labor market is deprived
of the benefits of a Walrasian auctioneer, and is characterized instead by decentralized
bargaining between workers and firms. Inefficiency in the goods market is introduced
through a distortion in the profitability of firms, which can either be interpreted literally
methods and plant layout, versus those that didnot.The rormerincreasedtheir productivity by an average
of 17 percent during the period, while the latter increased productivity by less than I percentonaverage.
3Results for AII industries except 3573," table I,p. 207.
3as the result of distortionary taxation or more loosely as capturing the effect of "aggregate
demand" on profitability. To study the cyclical timing of creative destruction, we subject
the economy to exogenous fluctuations in profit margins, which may either be "real" —
dueto fluctuations in the price of intermediate inputs —ordue to fluctuations in the
above-mentioned aggregate-demand distortion.
Section 3 focuses on cyclical aspects of creative destruction. We contrast the cycli-
cal response of an efficient economy with an inefficient economy in terms of observable
characteristicsof timing and volatility of creation, destruction and unemployment. In
our efficient economy, the sole role of unemployment is to facilitate labor reallocation.
An efficiently restructuring economy will concentrate reallocation in recessions, when the
opportunity cost of unemployment is lowest. Thus both job destruction and creation
rise in a recession to increase labor reallocation. We show that market inefficiencies can
disi-upt this tightly synchronized pattern and decouple creation and destruction.
Section 4 turns to the effect of labor market inefficiencies on the pace of the creative de-
struction process. Under what conditions will the restructuring of the productive system
be excessively sluggish, and result in technological "sclerosis"? When will restructuring
be, on the contrary, wastefully rapid, and result in what one might call technological "hy-
perkinesis"? Surprisingly, we find that, irrespective of whether workers are excessively
weak or strong, labor market inefficiencies in either direction always lead to sclerosis.
Finally, section 5 analyzes policy. In the absence of an institutional cure for labor-
market failures, we look at the effect of government incentives to production and creation
decisions. Expanding the economy through production incentives can reduce unemploy-
ment, but at the cost of exacerbating sclerosis. Could the latter effect more than offset
the welfare benefits of the former, rendering desirable —asthe pre-Keynesian "liquida-
tionist" view has it —acontraction that "cleanses" the productive structure? We argue
against this possibility, and show that, as long as more unemployment is undesirable, cre-
ating a contraction cannot be beneficial on the whole. An expansion driven by creation
subsidies, on the other hand, has the opposite effect of alleviating sclerosis as it acceler-
4ates the pace of reallocation. A small dose of creation subsidies can thus be beneficial,
but a large dose can lead to excessively rapid restructuring of the type documented by
Young (1992) in the case of Singapore. We show that it is through an optimal dynamic
combination of both types of policies that the economy can recover its full efficiency.
Relation to the Literature. Our paper relates to several strands of research in the liter-
ature. A rich body of research developed in the 1960s that analyzes steady-state creative
destruction in a vintage model of embodied technological progress (see, e.g., .Tohansen
1959, Solow 1960, Phelps 1963, Sheshinski 1967). More recent analyses of creative de-
struction in an endogenous-growth vein can be found in Aghion and Howitt (1992a) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991). Our paper addresses the question of efficiency of the
creative destruction process, and analyzes how market failures can disrupt the pace of ----fl-
reallocationand lead to distorted unemployment rates. In this last respect, it is related
to the work of Cox (1993) and Cohen and Saint-Paul (1994), who analyze structural fac-
tors by which embodied technological progress leads to "technological unemployment,"
and to Aghion and Howitt (1992b), who study the effect of different rates of technical
progress on steady-state unemployment.
An important dimension of our analysis concerns out-of-steady-state business cycle
issues. Mortensen and Pissarides (1993) and Mortensen (1993) use a search unemploy-
ment framework to interpret the evidence on gross job flows over the cycle uncovered by
Davis and Haltiwanger (1990,1992) and Blanchard and Diamond (1990). Although their
focus on search costs in firm-worker bargaining leads to useful insights, weargue below
that shifting the emphasis to specific investment costs along the lines of Caballero and
Hainmour (1994) is a more promising avenue in providing a satisfactory interpretation
of the facts.
Our work also raises an important warning for the literature on the role of allocative
vs. aggregate disturbances in driving employment fluctuations (Lilien 1982, Abraham
and Katz 1986, Blanchard and Diamond 1989, Davis and Haltiwanger 1994). Contrary
to the standard identifying assumption in the literature, aggregate shocks in our model
5have a reallocation effect and can therefore not be considered independent of reallocation
shocks.4 Moreover, the economy's response to aggregate shocks can look like the response
used to identify allocative shocks in the literature. Depending on bargaining parameters
in the economy, creation and destruction can be either positively or negatively correlated
and the Beveridge curve can be upward or downward sloping.
Our efficiency analysis of creative destruction over the cycle revisits the literature on
reorganizations (Davis and Haltiwanger 1990,Hall1990, Cooper and Haltiwanger 1992,
Aghion and Saint-Paul 1991, Gnu and Hammour 1991, Saint-Paul 1993) andshakeouts
(Caballero and Hammour 1994, Stiglitz 1993, BresnAhan and RaIl 1991 and 1992) during
recessions. We attempt to relate questions on the efficiency of reorganization over the
cycle to observable characteristics of the data, and ask whether a recession thatcleanses
the productive structure can be beneficial on the whole.
The analysis of government policy in the literature is often neglected. An exception
is Hopenhayn and R.ogerson (1991), who quantify the negative welfare-effects of policy
in a steady-state competitive industry subject to ongoing job turnover. Our paper also
tries to develop a substantive analysis of policy in a context where, because of market
failures, policy can play a positive as well as a negative role.
2 A Renovating Economy
Our first step is to present the model we will be using to analyze creative destruction
throughout the paper. We first describe the basic structure of our model economy. The
next two subsections characterize, in turn, the efficient centrally planned outcome and
the decentralized bargaining equilibrium. The last subsection asks under what conditions
the decentralized economy is efficient.
4A similar point is made by Abraham and Katz (1986) concerning Lilien's finding that employment
growth dispersion acro sectors tends to be high when unemployment is high. They argue that this can
be due aggregate demand rather than reallocation shocks, if we consider the different income-elasticities of
demand and different growth rates across sectors.
62.1 The Economy
'jWctivc Siructu￿ The economy trades in two goods: a produced good whose aggre-
gate output at time t is Q(t), and a non-produced good in fixed supply V. Its productive
structure is made up of many "production units" that combine in fixed proportions a unit
of capital, a unit of labor, and a unit of the non-produced good as an intermediate input.
Exogenous technical progress is embodied in production units and drives the continuous
process of their creation and destruction. Abstracting away from "learning curve" effects,
we assume that a production unit embodies the leading technology at the time t when
it was created and produces A(t) units of output, where the leading technologygrows
exogenously at rate 7> O.
Each production unit corresponds to a "job." The creation rate of new production
units corresponds to the gross hiring rate in theeconomy, and is denoted by 11(t). Pro-
duction units in operation fail exogenously at rate 6, and are scrapped beyonda certain
endogenously determined age. Both events free up a unit of labor.
If we denote by a(i) the age of the oldest unit in operation, it is clear from the above
that aggregate employment E(t) and output Q(t) are determined by the distribution of
production units aged between 0 and a(t):
(1) E(t) = H(t
—a)C6" da.
(2) Q() = A(t—a)H(t
—a)Cda.
Creation Costs; Creating a production unit is costly. Itrequires acquiring and ix-
stàJling-capital, searching for a worker, training him and organizing his job. Inmany
respects, this fact plays a determining role in our economy. In the absence of creation
5jovar,ovie and Lath (1989) study an industry'slong-run equilibrium in the presence of both vintage
andlearning-by-doing effects. It would be straightforward to endogenize the growth rate7' but, to keep thepaper focused,we decided not to exploit this dimension.
7costs, technology would be updated instantaneously and the distributionof production
units would be degenerate. Moreover, the bargaining problem between workers and firms
depends on the magnitude of those costs, their timing and the extent to which they are
"sunk." Finally, as we will see, the structure of creation costs is crucial for the responsive-
ness of creation, destruction and unemployment to aggregate shocks, and for the degree
of real wage rigidity.
The total cost, in terms of the produced good, of creating H(i) production units at t is
proportional to the leading productivity A(t), and can be thought of in terms of foregone
output. Because the distinction is important for the firm-worker bargaining problem,
C(H, U) is split into two components, investment 1(H) and search costs S(H, U)H: --
(C(H,U)A(i)—(1(H) + S(H, U)H]
Investment includes capital investment and installation as well as training and orga-
nizational costs. 1(H) is increasing and (weakly) convex in H. Convexity captures the
idea that it may be expensive to create fast, either at the aggregate or the individual
level, and provides a motive for "smoothing" creation.6
S(H, U) is the flow search cost required to expect one hire per unit time, and is
(weakly) increasing in aggregate hires H and decreasing in aggregate unemployment
U. It can be derived from a constant vacancy-posting cost and a matching function
H =H(U,V), H1, liv >0, where V denotes aggregate vacancies.'
Throughout the paper, we will be using the following functional form for creation
6Convexityat theaggiegate level maybe derived from a concave production (unction for capital. it
mayalso be derivedfrom linearindividual adjustment costs but a non-degeneratedistribution ofpotential
entrants(e.g. heterogeneousobservable skills), as in Diamond (1994). Convexity at the individuallevel
may be derivedfrom convex installation andtrainingcosts,assuming a fixed number of symmetric firms.
'Let a> 0 denote theunitflowcost ofpostinga vacancy. ifwe invertthematching function and write
itas V =V(H,U),then the unit flow cost of hiring a worker is S(H,U)= rV(H,tJ)/JJ.Theproperty
5> 0 requires that the matching function be less than unit-elastic with respect to V, which is a much




1(H) =c0H + c1H2,
S(H,U)=e2(#), co,c1,c2￿0,0q<1.
The quadratic specification for 1(H) yieldsasimple linearformfor the marginalin-
vestment cost.Thesearch cost specification can be derived from the constant returns
Cobb-Douglasmatching functionH =eUv'-.For notational simplicity, we henceforth
denote the creation cost and its components by C(t), 1(i) and 5(t).
Consumer-Workers. We close the model by introducing consumer-workers in the
simplest way possible. There are a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals indexed by
i[0,1], each endowed with one unit of labor and shares over production units and the
stock of non-producedgoods. Individual i's intertemporal utility at time t is given by
JIQ:'(s)+p(s)A(s)Mf (s)]e'' ds.
Utility is linear in both Q(s) and Mf(s),i's consumptionat s of the produced and non-
produced goods.8 Linearity greatly simplifies the consumer's side of the model, since it
implies risk neutrality and gives a constant interest rate equal to the subjective discount
rate r.Weassume r > to guarantee finite utility. p(s) is the marginal utility of the
non-produced good, normalized by the leading technology A(s) (due, e.g., to technical
progressin the utilization of the non-produced good). Using the produced good as a
numeraire, p(s) also represents the price (normalized by A(s)) of the non-produced good.
Cyclical fluctuations in the price of intermediate inputs are introduced by assuming that
p(t)issri exogenous function of time.
A few aggregate relationships will be useful. The two goods market equilibrium
conditions are:
'Itwould have been very simple to add a linear term lo account for a positive value of leisure. In the
equihbnum conditions below, the marginal value of leisure would have entered in exactly the same way as
the price of the intermediate input. We chose to drop this term for simplicity.
9(4) Q(t) =Q4(t)+ C(t)A(t),
(5)
where Q'f1Qf di, M4 fM'di, and, by fixed proportions, E(t) is equal to the
demand for intermediate inputs. Finally, aggregate unemployment is given by
(6) U(t) I —E(t).
2.2 The Central Planner Problem
We start by asking how a central planner would manage our economy, and derive the
corresponding efficiency conditions. This analysis will help us characterize the efficient
path of creative destruction, and will provide us with a benchmark for assessing the
efficiency of the decentralized outcome.
Since utility is linear, the central planner always maximizes aggregate utility, whatever
his distributional concerns may be. His problem is
(Htt))J [Qd(j) +p(t)A(t)Ai'(t)Idt,
subject to (1), (2), (4)-(6), and the constraints a(t),H(i),U(i) ￿ 0, for all i, taking as
given the path {p(t)}r>o and the history {H(t)}<0 that determines the initial distribution
of jobs.9 In this problem, the planner is assumed unable to improve the efficiency of
matching in the labor market and takes the matching function and cost parameters as
given.




9The constraint U(t) Ineednot be imposed explicitlybecauseit isguaranteed by 11(t) ?0.




(9) w_EQ) =—C,(i)+p(t), M(i) ￿ 0 with" ="ifU() >0,
and
(10) E(i) =C(i).
The marginal cost variables u9t)andZE(t)playan important role in the compar-
ison of the centrally planned with the decentralized outcome (the superscript E stands
for "Efficient"). They designate, respectively, the "shadow" wage of a worker and the
marginal creation cost ofajob, nonnalized by A(t). Equation (7) is an exit condition that
requires the quasi-rents from a job to be zero at the time of destruction: A(t —a(t))is the
output of a production unit that has reached the exit age (t) and k)+ui(t)]A(t)is
its operating cost, equal to the cost of the unit of intermediate input and of labor used.
Equation (8) is an entry condition that equates the marginal creation cost EE(t)A(t) of
a job created at t to the expected present value of quasi-rents over its planned lifetime
T(t) (A(t) being the job's output and, by (7), A(s —a(s))its operating cost at s).
The shadow wage t(t) is equal to the reduction —Cu(t) in total search costs that
would result were the worker to remain unemployed, plus the constraint multiplier ,i(t).
If the constraint U(t) ￿ 0 is not binding, the multiplier is zero and the "shadow" wage
is —Cu(1); if it is binding, the shadow wage is higher, equal to the value needed in (7) to
reach full employment.
The only beneficial function unemployment plays in this efficient economy is to reduce
the search costs of creation. Note that if limzj...0 Cu =oo(which is the case with functional
form (3) when c2 > 0), then there is always a small enough positive value of U that
satisfies (7), so it is always efficient to have some unemployment. If, on the other hand,
Cu0 and unemployment does not facilitate the creation process (which is the case
when c2 =0),then we have full employment U =0as long as p(t) is small enough to
11guarantee a minimum of profitability.
An equilibrium for the centrally planned economy is a path {a(t),H(i),U(i)}1>o that
satisfies the exit and entry equations (7)-(1O) and
(11) a(t)= T(t —
(12) U(i) =—H(i—a)e_5ado,
given a history {H(t)}1<0 that determines the initial distribution of jobs. Equation (ii)
gives the function TQ) implicitly as a transformation of ft(t),whichholds as long as
destruction is always taking place. It states that the age (t)ofthe oldest job at i
equalto the maximumlifetime T that was planned for it at its time of creation t—
Equation(12) gives unemployment as a function of the history of hiring, and follows
immediately from (1) and (6).
2.3 Decentralized Bargaining Equilibrium
We now turn to the determination of equilibrium in the economy whenthelabor mar-
ket is governed by decentralized bargaining and the goodsmarketmay be subject toa
profitability distortion.
The Bargaining Siiuaiion. Abstracting away from internal labor markets and on-
the-job search, we assume that all workers in new production units are hired from the
unemployment pool and all workers from destroyed production units return there. Firms
can freely enter the labor market at any time to create jobs. To create a job at time t,
a finn searches for a worker at the flow cost 5(i) described above. The match between
worker and firm creates a surplus 11(1) that must be bargained over. Assuming generalized
Nash bargaining, a share fi E]O, 1[ of the surplus goes to the worker and (1— fi) goes to
the finn.
The way the worker receives payment for his share over time is indeterminate, as
12long as the present value at t of the payments is /311(t). One assumption could be that
all payments to the worker are made at t,andthat a contract is signed that fixes the
planned maximum duration of employment to T(t), the value that maximizes the surplus
from the match. Alternatively, if such a contract is not enforceable, we could assume
a payment flow consistent with continuous Nash bargaining over the r.maining surplus.
In this case, one can show that the surplus reaches zero and separation takes place after
the same maximum duration T(t). Except for the time pattern of wage payments, both
assumptions are equivalent.
An important issue in calculating the surplus 11(t) is the way creation costs are taken
into account. The surplus from a match is the value it creates above the firm's and
worker's best alternatives. Thus, all search costs and match-specific setup costs incurred
before bargaining are "sunk" and cannot be subtracted in calculating the surplus. More-
over, even if match-specific setup costs are incurred after bargaining, there may not be
a way to get the worker to post a "bond" that would prevent him from renegotiating
his position after those costs are incurred.'0 To capture this distinction, we introduce a
parameter 4' c[O, 1J that measures the share of setup costs that are match-specific and
cannot be bonded away, and are therefore "sunk" for the firm. The two parameters 4'
and $ measure the relative bargainingpower of workers over finS, 4' strengthening the
worker's threat point and /3 increasing the share he gets of the surplus.
Business Cycles. The distortion to profit margins is introduced as a flow subsidy
z(i)A(t) (or a tax, if it is negative) the government pays to each production unit in
operation, and finances through a lump-sum tax on households. As we mentioned in
the introduction, this goods-market distortioncan be loosely thought of as a device that
captures the effect of aggregate demand on profit margins. Fom this perspective, cyclical
fluctuations in z(t) will have a similar effect to fluctuations in intermediateinput prices
p(t). Those two variables enter the profit margin in parallel, and will sometimes be
'°For a discussion of "bondinc issues in the contat of theefficiency wage literature, see Katz (1987). Foran expitzon of Nash bargaining in the prence of specific investment, see Grout (1984).
13grouped into a single "business cycle"variable:
(13) b(t)z(t) —p(t).
Throughoutthe paper, we assume that the path {b(t)}1>0iscontinuous and such that
positive creation and destruction are taking place at all points in time. Because our main
results do not depend on uncertainty, we assume that the path of b(t) is known with
certainty.
Equilibrium Conditions. Appendix A.1 derives the equations governing the equilib-
Hum bargaining situation described above. Given a history {H(1)}<0 that determines the
initial distribution of jobs,. an equilibrium for this economy is a path {a(t), H(t), U(1))>0
that satisfies the system of equations





(16) i23°(t) = [#In(t)+ SO)],




as well as equations (11)-(12) that define T(t) and U(t).
The decentralized equilibrium conditions (14)-(17) have the same structure as the
first-order conditions (7)-(10) of the central planner problem, except that cost signals
may be distorted. The exit condition (7) states that the marginal profitability of an
exiting job should be zero, but now the "shadow" wage {n'(t)A(i) (the superscript D
stands for "Decentralized") and profit margins (through z(t)) may be distorted. Similarly,
in the free-entry condition (8), the "effective" creation cost '(i)A(i) —definedas the
14marginal cost that is effectively being set equal to the present value of a production unit
—isin general distorted.
Both cost signals depend on the relative bargaining positions of workers and firms.
The shadow wage ñ5'(t)A(t) represents the opportunity cost to a worker of remaining on
the job rather than turning unemployed and searching for another job. It is equal to the
instantaneous probability H(t)/U(t) of finding another match times the part j9fl of the
surplus he would get there. By the free-entry condition, the latter turns out to depend
on the unbonded match-specific creation cost, and is naturally increasing (in partial
equilibrium) with the worker bargaining power parameters q and (3. It is important to
keep in mind that u3°Q)A(2) measures an opportunity cost, and not the actual flow of
wage payments received by employed workers."
The effective creation cost Z"(t)A(t) is also increasing (in partial equilibrium) with
worker bargaining power and fi.Intuitively,if finns lose a large share of the match
surplus to workers, their incentive to enter will be reduced and they will act as if they
faced an effectively higher entry cost.
The Nature of Unemployment Equilibrimn in this economy generally involves positive
unemployment, whose nature is intimately tied the bargaining situation between workers
and firms, If there were no unemployment, workers would find it infinitely easy to
find an alternative job. Their outside alternative of moving continuously from job to
job to capture their share of the match surpluses would make their shadow wage
infinite (equation 16). That would deter any job creation, which is inconsistent with full
employment. Unemployment thus acts as an equilibrium "discipline device" to limit the
bargaining power of workers and preserve firm profitability)2
Looking at equation (16), there is always a positive unemployment level U that gives
the shadow wage uWin(14), as long as c61n+S > 0. This last quantity measures the
"Under continuous Nash bargaining, itisequal to theactualwagepaid atlirms thathavereached the
scrapping age a(t).
'2Unemployinentplaysasimilar role as a discipline device in Borne efficiency wage models (e.g. Shapiro
and SLights 1984).
15match-specific creation costs thatcannotbe bonded away, equal to unbonded specific
investment plus search costs. It is those match-specific expenditures that in equilibrium
lead to the creation of a match surplus, and are equal to the firm's share of this surplus
under free entry. As we will see later, whether it is specific investment or search costs that
are the primary cause of the match surplus and unemployment can lead to import ant
differences in aggregate behavior.13 Note that the economy can exhibit positive unem-
ployment due to specific investment çbI > 0, even if search costs are zero (c2 =0)and
the centrally planned outcome requires full employment. Naturally if+ S =0,the
match surplus is zero and no unemployment is needed to discipline workers. In this case
the economy will be in full employment, as long as 6(t) is small enough to guarantee a
minimum of profitability —whichwe always assume.
2.4 Efficiency of the Decentralized Equilibrium
Cost signals in the decentralized economy are in general distorted, and the outcome will
not generally be efficient. However, there are conditions on the economy's parameters
under which the decentralized outcome will be socially efficient. Those conditions provide
us with a very useful benchmark for analyzing market inefficiencies.
Clearly, the first condition is that the profit margin distortion z(i)bezero. In this case,
one can show that the following configuration for the bargaining parameters guarantees
that i2" =Eand =EE,and thus that the decentralized outcome is efficient:'4
(fi) =(O,r).
F\xll bonding # =0ensures that firms recover all of their investment I,,(i). Efficiency
requires giving this extreme bargaining position to firms because we have assumedthat all
'5Agoodsynthesis of the literature on the second type of unemploymentbased on search ctscanbe
found in Pissaridee (1990).
'4Hosios (1990) discusses the efficiency condition in decentralized bargaining models based on search
costs.In general, this efficiency condition only exists if the matching function exhibits constant returns.
16investment is done by them. The condition fi =onthe share parameter helps equate
the private and soda! marginal costs of search, which are in general different because
of the well known "congestion" and "thick-market" externalities captured by the two
arguments in the function S(H, U).'5
3 Creation, Destruction, and Unemployment: Tim-
ing and Volatility
rn this section we focus on cyclical aspects of creative destruction. We contrast the
cyclica! response of an efficient economy with an inefficient economy in terms of observable
characteristics of timing and volatility of creation, destruction and unemployment)6
3.1Efficient Restructuring over the Cycle
We start by considering the response of an efficient economy, where (,fi) = (0,'j),to
business cyc!e fluctuations in 6(t). To be consistent we assume all fluctuations in 6(1) are
due to real fluctuations in intermediate input prices p(t), but a decentralizedeconomy
with the same bargaining parameters would behave exactly the same inresponse to an
(inefficient) demand distortion z(i).
Abasic but fundamental feature of the efficient economy is that the only role of
unemployment is to facilitate labor reallocation. Thus, if job creation entails only invest-
ment but no search costs (c2 =0),efficient equilibrium unemployment is zero. Aggregate
twoexternalities operate as follows: A decision to create a job and searchfora worker makes
search costlier toy others (SH ￿ 0); a decision to destroy a job and add a worker to the unemployment
pool makes search cheaper for others (Se, ￿ 0).
"Thedistinction between efficient and inefficient economies is starker when leisure unemployment is not
an important source of employment fluctuations. Those arepreciselythe circumstances we wanted to stress
byassuminginsection2.3 that b(t)is always lowenough towarrantashadowwageabovethevalue of
leisure(set tozero for simplicity).Forananalysis ofgross flows stressing the role of leisure inemployment
fluctuations, seeDavisand Baltiwanger (1990).
17shocks are entirely absorbed by fluctuations in the shadow wage, while all quantities
including labor market flows and stocks remain unaffected.
The introduction of search costs gives rise to unemployment, whose role is to facilitate
reallocation. Figure 1 simulates the path of such an efficient economy, with positive search
costs and linear investment costs (cc, c3 > 0 and c,= 0).Business cycles are generated
by a deterministic sine-wave in b(t).'7Panel(a) shows one full business cycle in 6(t),
with its trough in the middle of the diagram. Panels (b)-(d) present the path of output,
creation and destruction, and unemployment.'8
The dynamics of those variables are driven by the fact that the opportunity cost of
creating unemployment is lowest at the bottom of a recession, when production is least
profitable. Given that unemployment is needed to facilitate reallocation, it is efficient to
concentrate this process around the trough of the recession.'9 Recessions are thus char-
acterized by a sharp increase in destruction that spills workers into the unemployment
pool, followed promptly by a large spurt of creation, which reaches its peak at the same
time as unemployment. Creation, destruction and unemployment are tightly coordinated
and positively correlated, although with a slight job destruction lead to let unemploy-
ment accumulate. F\irthermore, there is a motive to concentrate the reallocation process
sharply around the recession's trough. Consequently, despite the symmetry of the driving
force, the economy's observed cyclical response is asymmetric. Recessions and recoveries
are sharp and short-lived, while expansions are prolonged and fade away slowly before
the onset of the next recession.
The extreme synchronization of the reallocation process_is a distinctive feature of an
'tThe figurewas generated with the following parameters: r = 0.065,=0.028,5 =0.05,i= Q3
and I =1.Creation cost parameters are e =0.0790,e1 =0and c2 =0.045.The economy is efficient
with bargaining parameters fi =qand =0.b(t)followsa sine-wave of period 4 years, mean 0.32 1, and
amplitude The simulation method used is the same as in Caballero and Hammour (1994).
'8%Vhat may appear as Irregularities" in some of the figures are in fact the result of the "echo" effect of
previous cycles on the age-distribution of jobs at the start of the current cycle.
11This point is emphasised by Davis (1987) and Davis-Raltiwanger (1990). The literature contains
several similar "opportunity cost" models of differenttypes ofinvestment activities during recessions —
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0.4 0.61.21.62.0 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0 defficient economy with significant search costs, where sharp recessions are a preparation
for strong recoveries. An efficient decentralized economy supports this equilibrium with
a shadow wage that does not accommodate aggregate shocks onefor one. This occurs
because unemployment facilitates creation, and the latter, by increasing the demand
for new hires, counteracts the direct downward pressures on the wage of an exogenous
squeeze in profit margins.
The incentive to concentrate reallocation near at the bottom of a recession may be
counteracted by an incentive to smooth the creation process. If marginal investment
costs are now increasing (ci > 0), creation must be smoothed, as it becomes expensive
to vary the intensity of creation over the cycle. Figure 2 presents the path of creation
and destruction in an efficient economy with both increasing marginal investment and
search costs (c.0,c1,c2>0)?0 Since the only purpose of destruction and unemployment
in the acient economy is subsequent creation, destruction and unemployment remain
synchronized with creation, and are therefore also smoothed. This strong joint-smoothing
behavior is another aspect of the coupling of creation and destruction in an efficient
economy.
3.2 Inefficient Restructuring: Timing and Volatility
The dynamics of creation, destruction and unemployment in the efficient economy is
fundamentally determined by the usefulness of unemployment for worker reallocation. If
the decentralized outcome does not happen to be efficient, the creation-cost saving signals
driving unemployment may be distorted. More dramatically, the timing of creationand
destruction may be disrupted and the two processes may be completely decoupled. We
discuss those two aspects of inefficient restructuring in turn.
The figure wasgeneratedwith thesameparameters as figure 1, exceptthatthe creation ccst parameters
are now e0= 0.0790,c1= 0.75and c2 =0.0113;and the b(i)wave isof mean 0.422 and amplitude OO64.
19Figure 2: Efficient Joint—Smoothing
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timeDistorted Reallocation Incentives. As we have seen, an efficient economy concentrates
reallocation during recessions, when the opportunity cost of generating the necessary un-
employment is lowest. The same intertemporal substitution incentives are also present in
an inefficient economy with significant search costs, but the extent to which restructuring
is concentrated in recessions may be out of line.
To see this point most clearly, we consider the same economy as in figure 1 (c<,, c2 >0
and c1 =0),but now introduce inefficiency in the form of /3rj(remainszero). Figure
3 shows creation (panel a) and destruction (panel b) for two economies that are identicai
except for their different values of /3.21Itis clear that a higher /3reducesintertemporal
substitution incentives. In such an economy, the presence of strong workers (/3> tj) will
tend to muffle fluctuations in profit margins, and the economy will restructure less than
efficiently during recessions; weak workers (/3< i) willlead to the opposite, and the
economy will restructure excessively during recessions.
Decoupling of Creation and Destruction. Distorted volatility results from models
of decentralized bargaining based on search costs. But whether the economy's cyclical
response is muted or amplified, creation and destruction remain tightly synchronized and
recessions remain a time of intense restructuring. New and potentially important effects
can result from the introduction of specific investment with imperfect bonding. Imperfect
bonding can derail the reallocation process over the cycle and decouple creation and
destruction, both in terms of synchronization and joint-smoothing. Recessions become a
time of wasteful unemployment, unassociated with greater reallocation activity.
The decoupling of creation and destruction is most clearly analyzed by temporarily
setting search costs to zero, so unemployment plays no role in facilitating reallocation.
Much of what happens in this case to the cyclical pattern of creation and destruction 1s
driven by "rigidity" in the shadow wage tii°(i).Recallthat, when c2 =0,the shadow
wage in the efficient economy (= 0or /3= 0)absorbs one-to-one all fluctuations in b(t).
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c?LO 0.4 0.9 12 1.62. 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0The economy exhibits no unemployment and no quantity responses to cycle. If workers
have some bargaining power (,fi >0), the economy becomes inefficient and generates
positive unemployment. Not only may the wage only partly offset movements in b(t),but
whatever part of the change in 6(t) it does offset will also require quantity movements
in unemployment and hiring to bring the wage to its new equilibrium (see equation 16).
The first type of shadow wage rigidity we call overt rigidity, and the second type covert
rigidity.
Creation-Driven Recessionj. The form of wage rigidity affects the nature of recessions,
whether they are principally time of depressed hiring or times of intense destruction and
cleansing of the productive structure. An interesting feature of our economy is that the
nature of wage rigidity is detennined by the —apparentlyunrelated —structureof
creation costs. Most inefficient parameter configurations involve both types of rigidity,
but in the extreme case where marginal investment costs are constant (c1 =0),the
economy exhibits a pure form of covert rigidity. In this case, recessions are entirely
creation-driven.
To see this note that constant marginal creation costs implies that the free-entry con-
dition (15), together with the definition of T(t) in (11), is solved for a constant scrapping
age ä. But the latter can occur only if the profitability (14) of exiting kr-year old jobs
remains unchanged over the cycle, which requires that the wage fully absorb fluctuations
in 6(t). Although the wage falls in a recession by the same amount as in an efficient econ-
omy, covertly it is rigid because this drop requires by (16) a fall in the hiring intensity
H(t)/U(i) —Le.a fall in hiring and/or a rise in unemployment.
The economy exhibits in this case a perfect "insulation" mechanism similar to that
discussed in Caballero and Hammour (1994), by which the fall in creation in response to
a negative profitability shock leads to a fall in shadow wages that insulates the profitabil-
ity of existing jobs.32 Recessions are completely driven by a fall in creation, while the
In Caballero and Hammour (1994) we model an industry in isolation facing an exogenous consumption
wageand downward-slopingdemand. Insulation operates throughthe goods rather than the labor market,
21scrapping age on the destruction margin does not respond.23 This leads to a breakdown
in efficiency and a complete decoupling of creation and destruction. Higher unemploy-
ment in recessions is wasteful, since the economy takes no advantage of it to intensify the
reallocation process. On the contrary, the rise in unemployment here is caused by a fall
in job creation, and the two are negatively correlated.
Destruction-Driven Recessions. Perfect insulation occurs in the extreme case where
marginal investment costs are constant. If investment costs are increasing (ci >0),there
is an incentive to smooth creation over the cycle. This dampens the cyclical response of
creation and its effect on 11(t) and U(t), and therefore limits the extent to which wages can
fall to accommodate a negative profitability shock and insulate existing production units.
The shadow wage exhibits in this case a degree of overt rigidity. By the exit condition
(14), this means that the scrapping age(t) must fall and the rate of destruction must rise
to accommodate part of the aggregate shock. To the extent this happens, recessions are
destruction- rather than creation-driven, and lead to a cleansing of outdated production
units.
Figure 4 presents an example of the phenomenon discussed above, when aggregate
investment costs are convex (co, c1 >0)and there are no search costs.24 The business
cycle nriable b(t) in panel (a) is similar to that in figure 1. In sharp contrast with the
efficient cycle in figure 1, creation and destruction. are decoupled and are now negatively
correlated (panel c). The stark difference between the efficient and inefficient cycles in
figures 1 and 4 can seen in figure 5, which displays the corresponding Beveridge curves.25
The upper panel reveals the strong synchronizing incentives of unemployment acting as a
viamovementsalongthe demand curve. -.
'Tbis does not mean that the rate of job destruction remains constant over time. Despite the constant
scrapping age, destruction will vary as a result of the "echo" effect of past cyclical variations in hiring on
the current age distribution of jobs.
The figure was generated with the same parameters as figure I, except that the economy is now
inefficient with 0 = 1 and ft = 0.5; the creation cost parameters are c0 = 0.0790, c, = 1.00 arid r2 = 0;
and the bQ) wave is of mean 0.456 and amplitude
The free shift-parameter in the matching (unction (see section 2.1) waschasenarbitrarily to gencrate
this figure.
224.a: Aggregate Shock
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0.090 0.095 0.100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.120 0.125 0.130reallocation device in an efficienteconomy.Not only does creation rise as unemployment
rises, which could be thedirectresult of higher unemployment in the matching function,
but also creation efforts (vacancy posting) rise. Quite the opposite, the lower panel reveals
the downward-sloping Beveridge curve associated with the decoupling of creation and
destruction in an inefficient economy with unbonded specific investment. Contrary to the
identiing assumption used in the literature on the role allocative vs. aggregate shocks in
employment fluctuations (e.g., Abraham and Katz 1986, Blanchard and Diamond 1989),
the same type of aggregate shock can lead to either an upward or a downward sloping
Beveridge curve, depending on economic structure.26
In the presence of specific investment, imperfect bonding decouples creation and de-
struction not only in terms of timing, but also in terms of amplitude. Figure 6 presents
the cyclical response of an economy identical to the efficient economy in figure 2 (c0,
c1, c2 >0),except that bonding is now imperfect (0 C =1).Besides the obvious
level effects, imperfect bonding disrupts the precise timing of destruction followed by
immediate creation. Second, the smoothing of creation leads to more rather than less
volatility in destruction. The joint-smoothing behavior is also disrupted. In this ineffi-
cient case, destruction is too volatile and occurs too early relative to creation, leading to
an unnecessarily prolonged and volatile period of unemployment accumulation.
Search Costsv.Specific Investment. As we have seen, the nature of the creation
costs that create the match surplus to be bargained over is a surprisingly central deter-
minant of the cyclical dynamics in our economy. Inefficiency in decentralized-bargaining
models that focus on search costs takes the form of distorted volatility, while creation and
destruction remain synchronized. This is, for example, the one robust cyclical distortion
that arises in the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1993).27Shiftingthe emphasis
"Similarly,oneshouldbe careful in using the correlation between creation and destruction to identify
allocative vs. aggregate shocks (see Davis and Baltiwanger 1984).
"The Mortensen and Pissarides (1993) model also gives rise to negatively correlated creation and de-
struction, but that is a non-robust consequence of modeling choice in discretetime.It is assumed that
workerswhosejobs are destroyed at time t only join the unemployment pool at I + I. Thus, a negative
23Figure 6: Inefficient Decoupling
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trneon the imperfect bonding of specific investment derails the tight synchronization of the
reallocation process, both in terms of timing and amplitude.
The mechanics behind the cyclical response of the creation and destruction margins
center around differences in the way and degree in which the shadow wage D()absorbs
aggregate shocks. Much of the difference between models based on search costs and
models based on lack of bonding can be traced back to differences in wage "rigidity." As
can be seen in equation (16), introducing greater worker bargaining power in the form of
a larger share parameter fi leads to more sensitive wages to S(t), a measure of the match-
surplus the worker can capture as an outside alternative. Thus, an inefficiently high
leads to excessive wage sensiiivity to hiring intensity H(i)/U(t) in the labor market. That
is why, in this case, strong workers tend to dampen the economy's cyclical responsiveness.
Introducing greater bargaining power in the form of imperfect bonding and a positive
shifts the weight in wage-determination from search costs to specific investment, as
a determinant of the match surplus. This now renders the shadow wage excessively
rigid and unresponsive to hiring intensity H(i)/U(i) in the labor market. By decoupling
creation and destruction, it changes the nature of recessions from being a time of intense
reallocation, in the right or wrong doses, to being a time of wasteful unemployment —
causedeither by depressed hiring or increased destruction —unassociatedwith greater
reallocation activity.
4 Market Failures: Unemployment and Sclerosis
In this section we turn to the effect of labor market inefficiencies on the pace of the
creative destruction process. Under what conditions will the restructuring of the pro-
shock that increases destruction this periodwill only lead tohighunemploymentand cheap creation next
period. This leads firms to delay creation this period until the next, giving rise to a negative contempora-
neous correlation between creation and destruction, present even in an efficient economy. Notwithstanding,
the counterpart of our strong synchronization result lies in the positive correlation that they find between
destruction at t and creation at I+ 1.
24ductive system be excessively slow, and result in technological "sclerosis"? When will
restructuring be, on the contrary, wastefully rapid, and result in what one might call
technological "hyperkinesis"? Surprisingly, we find that, regardless of whether workers
are excessively weak or strong, labor market inefficiencies whatever their direction always
le.d to sclerosis.
4.1 Weak and Strong Workers
To study the pace of creative destruction, we consider the economy in steady state as a
tool of analysis. Our results will, nevertheless, be instructive about the average pace of
reallocation in a fluctuating economy and even about the effect of relatively low-frequency
cycles.23 In this subsection we derive an "equivalence" result that will be useful in the
subsequent analysis. We show that there is a form of steady-state equivalence between
the two bargaining power parameters and fi, that allows us to compensate workers for
a reductioninone parameter by increasing the other. We can thus divide the parameter
space in two well-defined regions where workers are too "weak" and too "strong," even
when one parameter indicates weakness and the other strength (e.g. fi <q and > 0).
We use a "*"todenote a variable in steady state. A steady state is an equilibrium
path with constant (,H,U), and requires a constant path for the exogenous variable
?. The economy's equilibrium conditions (l1).(12) and (14)-(17) in steady state become
(18) — [w_D—=0,
(19) =
(20) U. =1— !——
Withincreasing marginai creation costs, the average level of different quantities in a fluctuating econ-
omy may be different from their steady-state level. This is because, given the convexity of C(H, U) in H,








Wecan now state our equivalence result, which is proved formally in appendix A.2.
Consider an economy with positive search costs (c2 >0).Consider any pair/3)C
[0,1] x]0, 1[,andthe steady state (u,H;,U) that corresponds to (, /3) =(, $). Then
one can find a (weakly) decreasing function fo() over [0,1] such that, for any C [0, 1],
the corresponding steady state to (,fl)= (,fo())is (n,H;,Ufl. Naturally, we must
have fo(o) =fib.
Another way to state the result is that any steady-state outcome (,H,,Ufl corre-
sponds to a whole schedule (,f0()) of bargaining parameters. Quite intuitively, this
schedule is decreasing because a rise in one bargaining parameter must be offset by a fall
in the other, if we are to keep worker bargaining power and the steady-state outcome
unchanged. It is in this sense that the parametersand/3are"equivalent" in steady
state.
This result allows us to divide the bargaining-parameter space into two clearly de-
lineated regions of excessively "weak" and "strong" workers. In figure 7, we first draw
the "efficient" schedule (,fE())that corresponds to the efficient steady-state. By the
result in section 2.4, this schedule crosses the fl-axis at the point (,/3) = (0,j).All
equivalence schedules that start below this point correspond to weaker workers than is
efficient, and remain below the efficient schedule? All schedules above correspond t
stronger-than-efficient workers, and remain above the efficient schedule. Thus the efficient
schedule divides the parameter space into two regions: a region below it where workers
"Schedules cannot crs because each is drawn for a different steady-state equilibrium.




0 1are weak, and a region above it where they are strong.
4.2 Unemployment and Sclerosis
With the above classification of worker bargainingpower in steady-state, we are ready to
characterize the direction of inefficiency in the tworegions. It is clear from (l8)-(20) that
(U,r) are sufficient statistics to describe a steadystate, since H can then be obtained
from the unemployment equation (20). We will thus focuson those two variables. Our
results are clearest when we assumec1 =0.Because differentiating betweenc1 and
is much less interesting in steady state thanover the cycle, we choose to assume c1 =0
from now on and present our results in their clearestform.
Under- and Over-Employment Figure 8 traces thecurve in (U, fl)-space that is
generated by increasing p.30 The trough of the curvecorresponds to the efficient value
=fR()It is clear that unemployment isincreasing with fi. In other words, the
strong-worker region is characterized by under-employment, and theweak-worker region
by over-employment. This is what one wouldexpect, given that strong workers take
an excessively large share of profits and discourage labordemand, while weak workers
take an excessively small share andencourage labor demand. As discussed earlier, the
economy offsets an increase in the worker bargaining power withan endogenous rise in
unemployment that weakens workers and restores adequate firmprofitability.
More formally, appendix A.3 shows thatdU/dfl > 0 in the weak-worker region and
in the strong-worker region near the efficientequivalence curve. Although we could not
show formally that it is positive everywhere in thestrong-worker region, this wastruein
all the numerical examples we have tried.Moreover, the appendix shows that U —.L
asfl —,I.
Technological Sclerosis, If we turn to the scrappingage r, we find in figures that it is
3011e figurewas generatedwiththe following parameters; r = 0.065, = 0.028, 6 = 0I51rj= 0.51b = 0.390and I =1.Creation cost parameters are to =0.399, c,=0and c, =0.004.The bargaining parameters= 0.3 and 0.05ft<0.65.
27Figure 8: Effects of Increasing ci in Steady State
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too 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.12minimized at theefficientlevel of fi.Thus,unlike what happens with unemployment, the
economy exhibits the samedirectionof inefficiency for irinthe weak- and strong-worker
regions. Appendix A.3 shows formally that, in both regions, r is above itsefficient
value. Labor market failures whatever their direction always lead tosluggish renovation
and technological sclerosis. Sclerosis is thus a state of affairs thatany policy program
will most likely have to face.







This expression splits welfare in terms of the shadow income flows thatgo to different
factors of production. The first term JC corresponds to thepresent value of income that
goes to the owners of the initial distribution of production units. The second term is the
discounted value of income that flows to the owners of the intermediateinput (pV) and
to workers (u?fl.Notethat the shadow wage goes to both employed and unemployed
workers, because the latter also receive an expected flow i basedon the probability of
finding a job (see equation 29 in appendix A.1).
Now, we need to compare W across steady states that correspond to differentcon-
figurations of (,fi). Theproblem is that if we want to talk meaningfully about the
parameters (,fi) thatmaximize W, we need to start from the same initial distribution
of jobs. But this means that we will not be generallystarting in steady state. For this
reason, despite the fact that our result is quite general, we limit our discussion to the
limit case where (r— goesto zero. In this undiscounted case, initial conditions do not
matter and we can ignore the term K.
In this case, equation (24) shows that the bargainingparameters that maximize wel-
fare are the ones that maximize the shadowwage i?°. But the exit condition(18), which
can be written as=eTr+ 6, implies that maximizing i25"amountsto minimizing
r. Thus the efficient parameter configurations are theones that minimize .
28Intuitively, sclerosis in this economy —whetherworkers are weak or strong —isa
result of the undervaluation and misuse of labor as a factor of production. It is when labor
has the highest shadow value that the pressure to exit is highest on outdated techniques
and the pace of renovation is fastest.3' When workers have little bargaining power, the
reason for the undervaluation of labor is clear. When workers are strong, their shadow
wage should be high in partial equilibrium. But in general equilibrium, powerful workers
discourage job creation, leading to increased unemployment and a depressed shadow price
of an unemployed worker.
5 Policy
In this section we turn to government policy. What kind of policies can improve the pace
and cyclical features of the creative destruction process? What would be the effect of
those policies on unemployment and sclerosis? A simple answer is to recommend that
governments try to fix their problems at the root, and change the institutional aspects of
the labor market that are the source of what is essentially a supply-side problem. This is
often politically infeasible. In the absence of an institutional cure, we study two classes of
policies —productionand creation incentives —thatcan provide at least a partial cure
for the economy's ills. As we will see, those two types of policies affect the economy's
unemployment and sclerosis problems very differently, and could actually be combined
optimally to bring the economy to its efficient outcome.
3tWithout making the connectionwith bargaining power, Salter(1960)describes the relation between
wages andscrappingas follows: "When real wages are high, standardsofobsolescencearehigh, and a high
level of replacement investment ensures rapid adjustment to new methods. Conversely when real wages
are low, the capital stock is adjusted slowly to new methods and average productivity is lower" (p. 73):'
52Note that this discussion is about shadow wages, not actual wage flows. In fact, one can show that
— with continuous Nash bargaining — average wage payments are generally maximized in the interior of
the strong-worker region. Politically, labor may thus find it advantageous to push for an outcome where
workers have greater than efficient bargaining power.
295.1 Production and Creation Incentives
At first sight, policies that directly encourage creation —e.g.,an investment taic credit —
andthose that directly encourage production —e.g.,a reduction in the corporate income
tax —mayappear equivalent. As long as their benefits are the same in present value
terms, shouldn't they affect investment in the same way? In the presence of two margins,
this argument misses important differences in the way those policies affect destruction.
Creation incentives directly affect the decision to invest, and, throughmore intense hiring
in the labor market, indirectly prop up wage pressures on exiting jobs. Production
incentives not only affect investment decisions, but also directlyencourage firms to keep
outdated production units longer in operation.
We introduce production incentives in our model by simplyreinterpreting the sub-
sidy z(t)assuch. We introduce creation incentives by assuming a subsidy i(i)A(t)per
production unit created? In this case, the subsidy must be subtracted from the effective
creation cost in equilibrium conditions (I4)-(17):




We analyze those policies in a steady-state economy in terms of the sufficient statistics
(U,r). Appendix A.5 shows that an increase in the production incentive f reduces
unemployment but increases the scrapping age r. The subsidy protects outdatedpro-
duction units by absorbing the cost pressures to destroy them. The impact of creation
incentives is quite different. The appendix shows that an increase in i reduces thescrap-
ping age, while its effect on unemployment is ambiguous. A creation subsidy leads to
'3Distinguishing realistically between production and creation incentives can be quitetricky. Consider
aninvestment tax credit. Although it is primarily a creation incentive, it can act simultaneously as&
productionincentive if, through a Keynesian multiplier effect, it leads to an aggregate demand expansion.
As asecondexample, consider ataxholidayfor newinvestments. It actseffectivelyas a creation incentive
if it lasts less than a production unit's lifetime, but as a production incentive if it lasts more.
We apply full bonding to the subsidy because it is not match specific: lithe worker quits, the firm will
still be able to get the same subsidy by hiring another employee.
30greater hiring intensity that increases wage pressures to destroy outdated production
units. Its effect on unemployment depends on the degree to which destruction offsets the
positive effect of increased creation on employment.
Figure 9 illustrates the steady-state effects of production and creation incentives. The
solid and dashed lines represent the steady states that correspond to a range a values
for C and i, respectively (subsidies are positive and taxes are negative). The two lines
intersect at the point where C == 0.The figure was generated with what we take to
be a realistically small value for the search cost.35 In this small-c2 case, the two policies
appear almost "orthogonal": production subsidies are the appropriate tool to reduce
steady-state unemployment with little effect on r,whilecreation subsidies are the tool
to reduce sclerosis with little effect on U.
How do those conclusions carry over to temporary increases in zand1? If we think
of fluctuations as being driven by z(i),ourprevious analysis of business cycles indicates
that a temporary production subsidy will generally have a qualitatively similar effect to
a permanent one —lowerU(t) and higher (i). However, the result that the effect on
(t) is small when search costs are small does not generalize. We saw in section 3.2 that
recessions can have a strong cleansing effect on the productive structure even when search
costs are zero? Similarly, the intuition for why permanent creation incentives decrease
clearly carries over to temporary ones. It will still be the case that the resulting rise in
hiring incentives will increase wage pressures on exiting production units.
The figure was generatedwiththe same parameters as figure 8. We chose to model a s-inefficient
economy with bargaining parameters fi =0.5and th =0.3.We calibrated yf and the creation cost
parameters e0 andc2(we set c1= 0because it is not central for steady-state issues) so as to yield an
unemploymentrate (P = 0.065, ahiring intensity of W/U' = 3,and a search costS equal to 3 weeks of
the leadingtechnology's quasi-rents. Calibrationwasdonewith zero government incentives (1' = f=0).
Itis the last restrictiononrthat givesus the small valueforc2.Theimpliedscrapping age forthe
calibrated economyis V = 8.47 years.
asThecleansing effect of recessions a_rises in the imperfect-insulation case when c1 > 0. A large c1 is































0.105.2 Expansionary Policy, Liquidationism, and Accelerationisrn
Having characterized the effects of our two policy instruments, we can now assess them
in terms of welfare. We concentrate on the strong-worker region, where the economy
suffers from high unemployment and technological sderosis, and study the welfare effects
of introducing a small production or creation incentive.
Production Incentives and the "Liqtidaiionisin View of Recessions. In the strong-
worker region, the welfare effect of expanding the economy through a production subsidy
appears to be ambiguous. On the one hand, economic expansion can relieve the unem-
ployment problem; on the other it exacerbates the state of technological sclerosis. Could
the second effect dominate the first and make the expansion undesirable on the whole?
In this case, what the economy really needs would be a recession that "cleanses" its pro-
ductive structure —anidea reminiscent of the pre-Keynesian "liquidationist" view (see
DeLong 1991).
To address this question, let us first look at the steady-state welfare effects of a small
production subsidy df starting from f =0.As discussed in section 4.2, a meaningful
welfare comparison across steady states can only be undertaken in the limit case where
(r—y) goes to zero and initial conditions do not matter. In this case appendix A.4 shows
that the change in the flow of steady-state welfare in response to policy can be expressed
in terms of the response of the hiring intensity H/U:
(26) =(uY'
— ________
where& —Cu represents the .social shadow value of an unemployed worker. It is easy
to see that, when workers are strong, their decentralized-equilibrium shadow wage
is always greater that their social shadow wage tii5(t).3' Since a creation incentive always
increases H/U (see appendix A.5), equation (26) shows that a small production subsidy
37Sincewe are comparing ,i? and for the same aggregate quantities, this statement corresponds to
the simple partial-equilibrium result that the shadowwageis increasing in the bargaining power of workers.
32is always welfare-improving in the strong-worker region. The exit condition (14) givesa
good intuition why the liquidationist view cannot hold here. The "cleansing" that results
from depressing the economy amounts to moving a worker from a job at the destruction
margin to the unemployment pool. Since the exiting worker produces (beDonthe job but
has a social value of only winthe unemployment pool, this produces a social loss of
((fleD— (beS) > 0.
This intuition carries over to temporary recessions as well, since the inequality tiS(t)<
D(j) holdsalso outside of steady state. Figure 10 shows the time path of the flow
of welfare that corresponds to the business-cycle simulation in figure 6,assuming the
business cycle is driven by fluctuations in z(i).itis clear that the flow of welfare is
procyclical.
Creation Incentives and "Acceleratjonisj" policies. Let us now turn to the steady-state
welfare effect of a small creation subsidy di starting from? =0.In the strong-worker
region, this policy would provide a partial cure for sclerosis by reducing r.Althoughits
effect on unemployment is ambiguous, we know by equation (26) that, since it increases
H/U (see appendix A3), it must be welfare-improving.
Naturally, a creation subsidy can only be beneficial up to a point. When the subsidy
becomes too large, the economy wilt suffer from a state of "hyperkinesis" with restructur-
ing happening at an excessively fast and costly pace. Government policy can thus give
rise to a new phenomenon of excessively low a,thatwe saw would not arise out of pure
bargaining-related labor market failures.
The case of Singapore as documented by Young (1992) seems to match well this pat-
tern of government-induced high investment and excess restructuring. In the 1970s and
1980s aggregate investment in Singapore reached phenomenal levels as a share of GDP,
peaking at 43% in 1984. High investment was to a great extent related to a combination
of tax incentives and widespread government participation in the finance oflocalcompa-
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cfLO 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.9 3.2 3.6 4.0nies (financed primarily by labor income taxation and forced saving). Not surprisingly,
during the same period the economy was undergoing one of the world's highest rates of
structural change in manufacturing, moving from one industry specialization to the next
at a very fist pace. Young's assessment of the Singaporean economy is that it invested
and restructured at excessively high rates. Compared to a laissez-faire economy like Hong
Kong, it reached a comparable growth rate but at a much higher cost.
5.3 Optimal Dynamic Policy
We have seen that production and creation subsidies affect the economy's creation and
destruction margins differently. This raises the question whether a judicious combination
of the two policies can correct the price signals that distort those two margins and restore
full efficiency.
In fact, the solution to this problem is quite simple. We can restore efficiency if we
use the creation subsidy to correct the distortion in the effective creation cost signal, and
the production subsidy to correct the shadow wage signal. In other words we need to set
(27) f i(t)=E9i)E5(t)= 1%I(t)+
I z(t)=iJ"(i) — 115(t)=
Taking(25) into account, it is straightforward to verify that the equilibrium conditions
(14)-(15) of the decentralized economy subject to those subsidies are identical to the
equilibrium conditions (7)-(8) of the corresponding efficient economy.
Consider what this implies for a strong-worker economy in steady state. Such an
economy suffers from high unemployment and sclerosis. In terms of figure 9, we need to
move it in the southwest direction. This can be achieved by a combination of positive
production and creation subsidies. The former mainjy reduces unemployment (westward
movement), and the latter mainly relieves sclerosis (southward movement). Thus, the
presence of strong workers —dueto imperfect bonding or a large worker.share param-
eter —requiresthat firms be compensated via a combination creation and production
34subsidies. The opposite policies are required when workers are weak.
In addition to the level effects above, equations (27) also solve for the cyclical aspect
of optimal policy design. In order to isolate this cyclical dimension, we remove level
effects by focusing on cases where (,fl) lie along the efficient steady-state equivalence
curve described in section 4.1? Figure 11 shows —p(2) in panel (a), the optimal creation
subsidy in panel (b), and the optimal production subsidy in panel (c).4° The last two
panels present curves for different configurations of bargaining parameters (, /9) along
the efficient equivalence curve. It is clear that optimal creation and production subsidies
are countercycical, and more so as the configuration of gives greater weight to imperfect
bonding .Aswe have seen in section 3.2, as workers derive more of their bargaining
strength from imperfect bonding rather that from the share parameter 9, the shadow
wage becomes increasingly rigid. Relative to the efficient economy, workers become ex-
cessively strong during recessions, when wages do not fall enough and unemployment is
too high, and excessively weak during expansions for the opposite reason. This explains
why firms must be given incentives during recessions, and taxed during expansions.
6 Conclusion
Economies are hardly static entities occasionally perturbed by various shocks. Rather,
they are dynamic, continuously restructuring objects, with large and sustained factor
reallocation flows. Tecimological unemployment, as described by Schumpeter, is a nat-
ural result of the frictions indigenous to the process of reallocation. But it comes with
no guarantee that unemployment is at the rigM levej,.Jhat restructuring occurs at an
adequate pace, or that the cyclical features of reallocation'èows are efficient.
In this paper, we have focused on the disruptive effects on creative destruction of
Thi guarantees that in steady state workersareneither too strong nor too weak. It does not guarantee
that the same is true on averugc in an economy with ongoing fluctuations. Bowever, figure II below shows
thatthis difference is second order.










11.b: Optimal Creation Incentives
t
11.c: Optimal Production Incentives1a malfunctioninglabor market where, deprived of the benefits of a Wairasian auction-
eer, workers and firma must meet and bargain in a decentralized manner. Interestingly,
we found that labor-market problems systematically lead to technological "sclerosis,"
wlether the bargaining-power balance is favorable or unfavorable toricers. The basic
rason is that, in general equilibrium, labor-market inefficiencies lead to a misuse aHdTih-
dervaluation of labor, which loosens the cost pressures to shut down outdated production
units. Simultaneously i'ith sclerosis, excessive technological unemployment can arise if
the bargaining power of workers is too high.
With strong workers, an effective policy response to sclerosis lies in the introduction
of incentives to create which, by increasing the intensity of hiring in the labor market,
prop up wage pressures to scrap old technology. But, as far as high unemploymentis
concerned, hiring incentives may not be a good remedy precisely because they lead to
increased scrapping. To partially reduce their effect on the destruction margin, creation
incentives must be complemented by means of policies that encourage firms to keep their
workers. Even the much-maligned imposition of firing costs may provide an acceptable
cure for unemployment, provided that they are conceived as a supplement to vigorous
hiring incentives.
Decentralized bargaining in the labor market can also disrupt the response of creative
destruction to aggregate shocks. In an efficient economy, there are strong reasons to
concentrate reallocation efforts in recessions, when the opportunity cost of generating
the unemployment needed to facilitate reallocation is low. Recessions should be times of
intense reailocation, when creation as well as destruction and unemployment are high.
With decentralized bargaining this process can be derailed, and creation can be decoupled
from destruction. Those effects are due to a form of real wage rigidity brought about
by a lack of bonding of match-specific investment —ratherthan the more usual search-
cost related factors. Such decoupling is consistent with the evidence on gross labor
flows documented by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992). Their evidence shows that
increased destruction and unemployment in recessions are associated with low rather
36than high creation. Moreover, the apparent "smoothing" of creation over the cycle finds
no counterpart in the behavior of destruction (see Caballero and Hammour 1994).
Rather than being primarily times of mere reall cation intensity, we interpret
recessions astimesof productivity cleansi g. This dnot mean that we find a case
for a revived "liquidationist" view of resions asirable. Increased unemployment
in a recession is essentially wasteful in t ntext. When workers are strong, their
shadow wage in production is greater than their social shadow value, and the difference
is lost when they are moved from production to unemployment. In the absence of an
institutional cure for malfunctioning labor markets, cyclical policy may be called for. In
the face of wage rigidity induced by imperfect bonding, the provision of counter-cyclical
incentives to firms may help improve the timing of labor-reallocation flows over the cycle.
37A Appendix
A.1 Decentralized Bargaining Equilibrium Conditions
This section derivesthedecentralizedbargaining equilibrium conditions(14)-(17) for
oureconomy. Let W1(t)denotethevalue to the firm of a job created at t, We(t) the
humanwealth ofaworker just employed insuch a job, and W5(i) thehumanwealth of
anunemployed worker.The setup cost of a single production unitis11q(t). Assuming
positivefree entry, we equate thevalueofa job to the match-specific creation coststhat
cannot bebonded away:
(28) [cbIH(i) + 5(1)) A(i) =W1(t)
Turningtoworkers' human wealth, the expected utility flow received by an unemployed
worker38 given by
(29) _jD()(j) =L?(wtQ) — Wu(t)).
It is equal to the instantaneousprobabilityH(t)/U(i) of finding a job times the resulting
gain in human wealth (Wt(t) —W"(i)).This quantity determines the simple arbitrage
condition governing the evolution of unemployed workers' human wealth:
(30) rW1t(t)= (1D(L)A(1)+
Once a matchoccurs, the surplusover which bargaining takes place is given by
(31)
11(1)=t+T(t)[A(t) —(.D(s) — b(s))A(s)] e_(r44)(1_Ods
—(1—$)IHA(t).
The surplusis equal totheexpectedpresent value of the cash flow received from the job
over its lifetime —equalto output A(t) minus the intermediate input cost p(s)A(s) plus
the subsidy z(s)A(s) —fromwhichwemust subtract the utility flow foregone
by the worker and the fraction of setup costs (1 —çb)Iythat is either not match-specific
38or can be bonded away.
The surplus is fIrst maximized to find the maximum planned lifetimeT(t) of the job,
and then bargained over. It is easy to see that the first order condition frommaximization
Is
(32) A(t) —1i20U +T(t)) —6Q+ T(O)J A(i + TQ)) =0.
It can be thought of as an exit condition, and states that, at the time ofexit I + T(t),
the quasi-rents from the job should be zero. Finally the surplus isshared, with fractions
fiand(1 —) goingto the worker and the finn:
(33) Wt(t) —Wt(t)=fifl(t);
(34) W1(t) =(1—fi)H(t).
Equations (14)-(15) in the main text are obtained as follows. Equation (14) is derived
using (29) and (33) from the exit condition (32), which can be written in terms of5(t)
using(11):
(35) A(i —W) — [ti°U)—
b(t4A(I) =0.
Equation (15) is the free entry condition (28), taking (31), (34) and (35) into account.
A.2 (.,/3)-Equivalencein Steady State
In this section we prove the steady-state equivalence result betweenandfistatedin
section 4.1. For any steady state (,H,U), we must determine the corresponding
equivalence schedule (,) = (, f())along which the steady state remains unchanged.
kIom equations (18)-(19) we know that for this to happen urDandEDmustbe constant
along those schedules.
39Now, replacing (21) in (22) yields
C.I C —&-rijmW
This meansthat a schedule (,fo(#)) that keeps ,rDconstantgiven (u;, H0,U;) also
keeps rD constant. This schedule can be easily obtained by inverting (21) and solving
for the wage in (18):
na/Ar.I C' ZIA\ I 'LffT.J — 1+j b+ r''(r,H•p•)=(,H,U;)
A.3 The Weak- and Strong-Worker Regions: Characterization
In this section we show that, in steady-state equilibrium, an increase in workers' bar-
gaining power (i) lowers the probability X H/U' of the unemployed finding a job,
(ii) lowers the scrapping age r if the worker is weak, but raises it if he is strong, and
(iii) raises unemployment. Given the equivalence result in section A.2, without loss of
generality we set =0in the proof of those statements.
Replacing &" from (21) in the exit condition (18), and differentiating, yields
(36) ...7_1rr=
(1—1 —)dX + (1—)2
di3.











which is strictly negative since PV'(r) > 0.
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Thus, r is decreasing (resp. increasing) with respect to worker power when workers are
weak (resp. strong), reaching a minimum at the efficient point.
As for unemployment, differentiating (20) we have
—— _2cdX
dfl S dfi
This expression is clearly positive in the weak-worker region, since both X and r are
decreasing with respect to worker power. In the strong-worker region, this expression is
more difficult to sign. All the numerical examples we have tried show U rising with /3
throughout the region, but we could not prove this in general. What we can show is that
dU/df3 is positive near /3 =q(because there dX/d/3 > I) and dr/d/30), and that
—IIas /3 —,1(because the effective creation cost goes to infinity while the present
value of the quasi-rents is bounded from above by 1/(r + 5) < cc).
A.4 Steady-State Welfare
This appendix derives (I) expression (24) for steady-state welfare in terms of factor income
streams; and (ii) espression (26) for the effect of policy on the steady-state flow of welfare
in the limit case when r —.y.
Replacing the accounting identities (4) and (5) in the social planner's objective func-
tion yields welfare at time t:
W(i) =J [Q(s)
—C(s)A(s)+ p(s)A(s)(M —E(s))} ds,
41which can be re-written as
W(t) =A(t)[q(s)
—C(s)+ p(s)(7J —E(s))]e_(?_1)(*_t) ds.
Using the expressions for output and employment, separating out the use and output of
factors committed before time t, adding and subtracting wages, subsidies and effective
costs, using the free-entry and exit conditions, and rearranging, yields
(38) = j°j°(e' —C1)C6a da cSfls—t) ds+







assuming the economy is in steady-state, and setting A(O) =1,transforms (38) into
=+' + G°L + iIunH2— e(Z —U)
—iH
which corresponds to (24), expanded to include production and creation incentives and
rents due to decreasing returns to scale in 1(H). The rent ICE, accruing to the factors in












which can be differentiated to yield
(39) dcat=(qH—Cq)dH+(q+p—C)dU.
It is easy to verify that, in steady-state with r ='y,we have q =-D_j andqj =
Replacingthose expressions in (39), and recalling E4 =C,and —C&,yields
dw =(6.D— — 35S)dH_(urD— I—w35)dU.
This immediately implies expression (26).
A.5 Effects of Production and Creation Incentives
This appendix analyzes the steady-state effect of production and creation incentives on
the hiring intensity, unemployment and the scrapping age.
Production Incentive.,. Assuming C =17,H= 0and letting X H7U, we can
differentiate (18) and (19) with respect to C to obtain









I dr\ I dr
39hZ = sgn
But this condition is only consistent with (40) if
CC—>0 and —>0. d.c dz
Using this result and differentiating equation (20) shows that unemployment decreases
with the subsidy f:
=—U2{(i —c4L. ÷sre-'1} <0.
Creation Incentives. Replacing (21) in (18) and differentiating the resulting expression
with respect to i yields
___ 5dX
(42) '11—q
Subtracting i from the left-hand side of (22), substituting the resulting expression in
(19), differentiating the outcome with respect to i, and substituting da/d1 from (42)
yields
1—p 0 di —S•'+ /JçbI + S/(1 —)J(1—e)/8
>
This,in conjunction with (42), implies:
dr<0.
Finally, as illustrated in figure 9, the response of unemployment to creation incentives
cannot be signed.
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